Arguments for God’s Existence-The Moral Argument (Part 5)

By Dima Zhyvov

This post is a continuation of the moral argument. Please see Part 1, Part 2, Part3, Part 4 if you have not read them yet.

What I intend to do in this part of my article is to critically examine the two potential ways that atheists might avoid the conclusion of my moral argument; namely, existentialism and Platonism. My plan is to briefly introduce these important concepts and their relevance to our present discussion, after which I will argue that, although both of these approaches capture, with some success, crucial aspects of morality, neither one is fully adequate to account for all that morality requires.  The reason why I think it’s helpful to analyze existentialism and Platonism together is because of their cogent critiques of each other, with which I am largely in agreement.  I am fully aware of an insurmountable challenge of doing justice to these two rich traditions given the space and purpose of my article, but I will attempt to assess the most important points.

Platonism

The Platonist says that there are objective moral values (every bit as transcendent and binding as those that Lewis believed in), but they stand in no need of foundations. On this view, objective moral values are brute facts or fixed features of reality; they are ultimate facts about the universe of which we become aware. Now, what are the obvious advantages of this view? Well, this position makes sense of our abiding conviction in the truth and obviousness of morality, as well as its ground in reality. It agrees with the claim that morality is self-evident, and it goes some way to provide a moral context for our choices, which some, most notably Kant, thought to be necessary to solve the so-called “dualism of practical reason” (see footnote 6, in Part 4 for details). It asserts that reality is somehow committed to morality and that moral obligations can be understood as entities that objectively exist and have some power over us. So what would a “Platonized naturalist” (from now on “PN”)[1], also known as an Atheist Moral Platonist,  say in response to my argument? Well, as a moral realist, she will readily agree with my first premise (“Certain moral facts exist, and among them are objective moral values and duties”), but will probably deny the crucial inference I make in the second premise, namely the claim that, in the absence of God, objective moral values and duties are implausible, if not altogether ruled out. How could PN attempt to justify her position? Well, it isn’t entirely clear. One possible way, which some have chosen, is to argue that no such foundation is required due to the obviousness and self-evidence of the truth of morality. As I have noted in the beginning of my article, the thought here seems to be as follows: if the foundational intuitions of morality are as independently self-evident as the axioms of geometry, then it follows that no grounding is in fact necessary (see item 2 on the list given in Part 1). Furthermore, for such a person, a suggestion that the obvious truth of morality provides non-negligible evidence for God’s existence as well as reason to think that this obvious truth depends ultimately on God, might seem inconsistent. Why? Because it may appear odd to argue that moral truth is dependent on God if we can know it without even thinking of God. Recall objection 3 from the list in Part 1, which holds that epistemically, theists are in no advantage over atheists in their innate ability to apprehend the existence of objective moral values and duties. Not only are atheists fully capable of perceiving whatever objective moral realm there may be, but they are able to successfully carry those obligations out, or at any rate, no less successfully than theists. How are we to respond to the argument against the need of a sound foundation of morality as well as respond to the position of PN in general? Several points present themselves by way of reply.
1. The alleged inconsistency can be easily resolved if we recognize an important distinction that numerous philosophers have pointed out but which far too many people continue to forget: the difference between the order of being and the order of knowing. This distinction can be cast more generally as the basic difference between ontology and epistemology. The latter has to do with the order in which we come to know things, while the former concerns the order in which things exist, or have come to exist. They obviously are not the same thing. Certain moral truths might be as evident to us as anything can ever be, but may still leave unanswered the question of where morality came from. Likewise, as David Bagget points out, “the foundations of morality might be at a greater distance from us in terms of immediate knowledge than morality itself”[2]. Suppose that God in creating us, instead of confining the foundational moral truths to some chosen few, whom he entrusted with his special revelation (an example would be the Bible), chose to reveal it to all of us indiscriminately through nature. On such a view, one does not need to be a Christian to know that cruelty is a vice or saving a drowning child, when it is within one’s power, is a moral obligation. Neither does one necessarily need to think about God to sense moral guilt that results from some wrong action. All of these things may be known by us in a similar way that the physical world is known by both theists and atheists alike. The fact that my atheist friends can just as easily perceive and interact with the universe around them in no way undermines the necessity of an adequate explanation of where the universe came from or a plausible foundation of its existence. Why could not something similar hold for morality? Why could not God make morality epistemically accessible to all of us, regardless of our ultimate convictions about the grand ontological truths pertaining its existence? Indeed, the Biblical record seems to be suggesting that this was, in fact, the way God chose to create our world. In the book of Romans, Paul writes, “Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them” (Rom 2:14-15, NIV, emphasis mine). I think once we understand the distinction between the order of being and the order of knowing, this objection falls apart.
2. Why think that just because something is so utterly obvious to us, it follows that somehow the need for an ontological account of that something is dispensed? What is the connection between self-evidence and the need or lack of a metaphysical ground anyway? Until and unless the detractor comes up with satisfying answers to these questions, their objection will remain unpersuasive.

But where does the failure of the objection to do away with a need for adequate ontological foundation of morality leave PN? You may recall that PN affirms that objective moral values do exist but are not grounded in God. Indeed, according to them, moral values have no further foundation. They just exist.
It is difficult, however, even to comprehend this view. As William Lane Craig points out, “What does it mean to say, for example, that the moral value Justice just exists? It’s hard to know what to make of this. It is clear what is meant when it is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering when it is said that in the absence of any people, Justice itself exists. Moral values seem to exist as properties of persons, not mere abstractions-or at any rate it’s hard to know what it is for a moral value to exist as a mere abstraction…Atheistic Moral Platonists seem to lack any adequate foundation in reality for moral values but just leave them floating in an unintelligent way”[3]
To this I want to add the unintelligibility of moral duties if PN is right: the nature of moral obligation seems incompatible with PN. Let’s suppose that our cherished values of Mercy, Justice, Love, Tolerance and the like just exist. How does that result in any moral obligations on me? Why would I have a moral obligation, say, to be tolerant? Who or what issues such a duty on me? Is it even coherent to comprehend a duty without a person issuing it, and before which one is to be accountable? Why should I give a slightest consideration to these abstract objects[4]? Why should I, or anybody else for that matter, align my life to these queer impersonal entities?  I take it that in the Platonic world moral vices such as Greed, Hatred, and Selfishness presumably also exist as abstract objects. Why should I choose to align my life with the virtuous group of abstract objects as opposed to the vicious ones? How much more potent theism appears when compared with Atheistic Moral Platonism!
It is also important to note here that all of the difficulties for naturalism to explain various salient features of morality remain intact (see Part 4). Suppose, these abstract moral values exist in an intelligent heaven, even though there is no God. How will it solve the problem of determinism identified earlier, which seems to be the most likely scenario given naturalism? Even if PN is right, the existence of moral responsibility, moral freedom, moral blame and praise, classically construed, is still inexplicable.
Finally, a dazzling problem arises for Atheist Moral Platonists; namely, the apparent astronomical improbability of the fact that just the sort of creatures would emerge from the blind evolutionary process that corresponds to the abstractly existing realm of moral values. How probable is that? It seems to me to be an utterly incredible coincidence when I think about it. To quote Craig, “It is almost as though the moral realm knew that we were coming”. But this of course would contradict naturalistic philosophy. On naturalism, “Platonized” or not, such things as intention and purpose must be absent on the cosmic level by the very nature of what naturalism is.
In short, I do not think that Platonism is a viable option for a consistent and honest naturalist. Although I believe Atheist Moral Platonists got it right when they insist on the reality of the objective moral facts, I think they seriously lack a sound foundation for moral values they so much cherish and uphold. I applaud them for their vigorous defense of the first premise of my argument and find their contribution extremely helpful. These obvious virtues, however, do not ultimately help them to cover a more serious problem for their position: that of the tension with naturalism. I conclude that the conjunction of Platonism and naturalism appears to be highly problematic at best and hopelessly contrived at worst.

Existentialism

I want to begin our discussion of existentialism by quoting at length a passage from Jean Paul Sartre, the infamous French proponent of this movement:

“Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavored to formulate a secular morality, they said something like this: God is a useless hypothesis, so we will do without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori existence ascribed to them. It must be considered obligatory a priori to be honest, not to lie, not to beat one’s wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do a little work on the subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all the same, inscribed in an intelligent heaven although, of course, there is no God. In other words… nothing will be changed if God does not exist; we shall discover the same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and shall have disposed of God as an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself. The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that “the good” exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men.”[5]

This passage is fascinating for several reasons, not least its contrast to something like a Naturalized Platonism. These two approaches, although both potentially avoiding the conclusion of the moral argument, are nevertheless miles apart from each other. Atheist Moral Platonists, on the one hand, uphold the first premise of the moral argument wholeheartedly, but fail to see the implications of their atheism, thereby rejecting the second premise, mistakenly in my view. Existentialists, on the other hand, seem to fully come to grips and honestly face the sobering truth of God’s non-existence. They agree with the second premise, which implies that if naturalism is true, then objective morality does not seem to have any adequate foundation. For existentialists, Naturalized Platonism is a joke, a feeble and unsuccessful conjecture of those atheists who want to have their cake and eat it too. Atheist Moral Platonists are seen by existentialists to be romantics, who hope to escape the inescapable, the reality of moral nihilism in the world without God. There is, therefore, something profoundly honest and admirable about Sartre’s view, something worthy of our respect. This is not to say of course that his position is entirely consistent. The problem that Sartre faced was that moral nihilism is practically unlivable. Therefore, the solution to this horrible predicament needed to be found. According to Sartre, what was needed, however, was not Platonism, postulating actually existing objective moral realm to be discovered by us, which for Sartre was nothing more than wishful thinking. His solution was an invention of morality, not its discovery. But how was this to be done? It is here that I think Sartre made an irrational leap in the face of a purely materialistic universe necessitated by atheism – he, understandably, perhaps even heroically, but ultimately unjustifiably, denied determinism. Not only did he not endorse determinism, while giving little argument for doing so, he endorsed an understanding of freedom so radical that it destroys the possibility of any objective value system by painting human beings as not mere discoverers of morality, but its inventors. To quote Jerry L. Walls:

“Sartre may have been right to suggest that our choices shape who we are and that they reflect what we think an ideal human ought to be, but none of that implies that our choices determine value. He has provided simply no objective basis for our cherished moral convictions, such as the wrongness of beating one’s wife or the rightness of responsible child rearing. And any sense in which our choices, construed along the existentialist lines, involve a choice for all humanity, as Sartre put it, remains more than obscure… Existentialists like Sartre try capturing moral freedom by assuming it as axiomatic, but they interpret it so radically that we have to discard our convictions about traditional morality”[6]

I hereby conclude our brief and no doubt incomplete discussion of Platonism and Existentialism as the two potential ways that atheists might avoid the conclusion of my moral argument. We considered Platonism first and noted that although it rightly tries capturing strong moral truths, it struggles or unduly refuses to give any sound ontological account for them. We also observed that the Atheist Moral Platonism still lacks resources to make genuine moral freedom possible. Then we briefly considered existentialism and came to a conclusion that, although its denial of determinism and its treatment of moral freedom as indispensable for morality are admirable, this maneuver, when viewed from within an atheistic paradigm, ultimately seems unprincipled and inconsistent with the rest of what existentialist believes. Furthermore, it became clear that despite existentialists’ honest assessment of the logical implications of a godless universe, they failed to come up with a solution and “invent” stable moral truths that could at least remotely secure their own intuitively apprehended and cherished moral convictions. But morality, traditionally understood, cannot function without both genuine moral freedom and solid moral truths. Therefore, neither Platonism nor existentialism, seem capable, in my view, to successfully account for the salient features of morality and hence to avert the force of the moral argument here presented.

To be continued…

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[1]I have borrowed the term from Bernard Linsky’s paper Naturalized Platonism vs. Platonized Naturalism (available on-line here)

[2]Good God, David Bagget and Jerry L.Walls, Oxford University Press, p. 15

[3]William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p. 178

[4]Bear in mind that what distinguishes abstract objects from, say, concrete objects is the fact that abstract objects stand in no causal relation to anything. Thus, abstract mathematical objects, such as number 5, for instance, cannot cause anything.

[5]Jean-Paul Sartre, ”Existentialist Ethics”, in Classic Philosophical Questions, p.180

[6]Good God, David Bagget and Jerry L.Walls, Oxford University Press, p. 27

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