By Dima Zhyvov
Please read the introduction to this series before reading this article.
Introduction
My first acquaintance with moral apologia came from reading Mere Christianity by C.S. Lewis. Since then I have read quite a few other works in which some sort of moral argument for God’s existence was discussed and I must say that I am still impressed by Lewis’ book and especially his ability to present the moral argument in a concise, accessible, and yet, compelling way. So in talking about morality as the third piece of evidence in our cumulative case for God’s existence, I thought it was only fitting to begin our discussion with C.S. Lewis’s moral argument from Mere Christianity. In this book Lewis asks his readers to reflect on something utterly commonplace: the way we use language, especially when we quarrel. People on both sides of the arguments frequently make appeals to laws or rules of appropriate human conduct, revealing their belief in a standard of right and wrong. Lewis called this standard the “law of nature”, though, as is obvious in his writings, he believed this law to be something that transcends the natural order. Whereas we have no choice but to yield to a physical law like gravity, we do have a choice to obey or disregard the moral law in the realm of our mind and will. Lewis thought that by “law of nature” we really mean a law of human nature, and he explained that the reason why it is appropriate to refer to this law in such a way is because of how we come to the knowledge of this law. Lewis thought that people know it by nature and do not need to be taught it. They just seem to apprehend the reality of this law in a direct or intuitive way.
This is not to say, of course, that all moral facts carry with them obviousness and clarity. There are cases in ethics in which it is rather difficult for someone to know just what the right course of action is from a moral point of view. Furthermore, there are so called moral dilemmas where no matter which course of action a person might take, the consequences will be severe. I think what such dilemmas teach us is just how complex situations in life can get and how many factors must be weighed before a responsible ethical decision is to be made. This, of course, is true of every area or dimension of our lives, not only of morality. So in no way do I dispute the existence of such ambiguous or difficult cases in ethics, but neither do I reject Lewis’ idea that at least some moral facts or truths exist, whose validity is so obvious that it is not surprising that they are universally acknowledged by people. Some examples include a belief that it is wrong to torture children for fun, or that it is wrong to take human life without any justifying reason, etc. Now notice that with the latter example there can be, and in fact are, different points of view as to when or under what conditions it can be justified to take a human life or even what counts for a human life (think of a raging debate over the issue of abortion in the US, for instance), but what is acknowledged by all parties of the debate, albeit implicitly, is that unjustified killing of a human being is wrong. Interestingly enough, so-called “pro-life” and “pro-choice” proponents have quite a bit in common, whether they realize it or not. Their most fundamental moral commitments are similar. Where they differ is on the correct practical application of these principles.
So this is the first part of Lewis’ argument: there is an objective moral law that is binding on our actions. By this Lewis meant that there are objective moral facts. Among them are guilt for wrongdoing, duties we are obliged to obey, and duties we are responsible for neglecting. The second part of his argument has to do with making an inference on the basis of this evidence. Lewis argued that the moral law that tells us just how we ought to behave gives us compelling reason to believe in God. In order to substantiate this latter claim, Lewis first narrowed down the potential accounts of the moral law to naturalism and religion, after which he argued that the objective moral facts are better explained by a religious understanding of reality than by a naturalistic understanding of things.
In short, “naturalism is a view that the physical world is all there is, and behind it there is no ultimate pattern or plan or purpose”[1]. In contrast, a religious conception of reality involves a belief that something else exists behind the physical laws; likely a mind of some sort. In describing just what he means, Lewis put it like this:
“That is to say, it is conscious, and has purposes, and prefers one thing to another. And on this view it made the universe, partly for purposes we do not know, but partly, in any rate, in order to produce creatures like itself… to the extent of having minds.”[2]
When Lewis considers these two drastically different views on the world, he finds it hard to believe that the source of our moral obligation is mere matter. Certainly, one can come up with a possible evolutionary account of feelings of or beliefs in moral obligation. Granted, but how would naturalism explain obligation itself? It is difficult to see how something like an objective moral obligation or, indeed, persons with intrinsic value and dignity can emerge out of valueless impersonal stuff. The existence of such entities as moral obligation appears to be at odds with naturalism, at least on the surface of it. Seeing the failure of naturalism to ground the existence of moral facts, Lewis concludes that if there is something more to our moral sense, it is more like a mind than a collection of atoms or a set of empirical properties.
In this article, I will be defending a version of the moral argument that is construed along the lines of Lewis’. I prefer to use an abductive approach here and argue that theism offers the best foundation of morality over against its non-theistic rivals. By casting my argument in this way, I hope to avoid a misunderstanding that I am claiming that no non-theistic account for moral realism is possible in principle. Rather I will be advancing a more modest claim and will be arguing that non-theistic accounts of moral realism are nevertheless implausible given certain salient features of morality, even though one cannot disprove each one of them absolutely. As was mentioned in the introduction of this series, such demand for certainty is far too stringent to be reasonably expected in a normal philosophical discourse anyway.
For all the praise of Lewis’ work, I must admit that the argumentation which Lewis gives in Mere Christianity, while serving as an excellent introduction to the topic and providing the contours of a good moral apologia, is nevertheless vulnerable to a number of important criticisms and concerns, which the moral argument must answer in order to be successful. What are some of the concerns or questions that have been raised by the skeptics of the moral argument which must be addressed? Let me list 8:
- Is not Platonism, the notion that moral values and duties exist in an intelligent heaven even though there is no God, a potential way that atheists might avoid the conclusion of the moral argument?
- If the fundamental intuitions of morality are as independently self-evident as the axioms of geometry, doesn’t it follow then that they are in need of no grounding?
- A very popular objection, somewhat related to question 2, runs something like this: If atheists can apprehend the existence of objective moral values and duties and act upon them, does it not refute the very idea that God is required as the foundation of morality? If theists claim that morality is somehow grounded in God, are they not being arrogant in their presumption that atheists cannot be good or moral people?
- Why think that objective moral values and duties exist in the first place? If evolution is true, does not an evolutionary account of morality basically do away with, or at the very least, cast substantial doubts on the validity of our moral sense or intuition. Doesn’t it follow then that making any claims on behalf of recently evolved primates to the effect that objective moral facts actually exist, is nothing more than a useful fiction or illusion?
- Does not the fact that there are different cultures and different views on what is morally prohibited or obligated provide a defeater to the objectivity of morality?
- Even if you survive all of the above, is not the theistic framework for morality itself incoherent? How exactly does God serve as a foundation for objective moral values and duties? Why is he necessary? Does not the infamous Euthyphro dilemma make any attempt to ground morality in God untenable? In other words, did not Plato put to rest all attempts to ground morality in God?
- What about the problem of God issuing abhorrent commands? If our moral obligations are constituted by something like divine commands, does it not make morality arbitrary; a mere toy in the hands of a whimsical divine dictator? If right and wrong are dependent on God’s commands in the way the divine command theory of ethics is claiming that they are, would not literally anything fly as being right or wrong?
- Related to the above is the problem of ethics in the Old Testament. The objection here would be that God, as described in the Old Testament, cannot be a solid foundation for ethics because of the atrocious commands attributed to him in the Bible. Obviously this objection is directed at those theistic traditions that uphold the Old Testament as part of their Holy Scriptures.
Do these objections succeed? Do they offer a devastating defeater to the whole enterprise of moral apologia? Well, I don’t think so and with this article I hope to show not only that a careful theistic framework for morality can survive these assaults, but also that, surprisingly perhaps, it becomes all the more solid in the end.
Without further ado, let us delve into the argument.
Click here to see part 2 of the article
Hi Dima,
It’s interesting to see you use Lewis’ quotes on the basics of moral argument. It happens that I read his Mere Christianity just a few days ago and was surprised to see him develop the moral argument.
Thank you for the article. I’ll continue reading the remaining parts very soon.